




AN UNBALANCED STANDARD:  SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF 
ELECTRONIC DATA UNDER THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE 
Rachel Flipse* 
The evolution of technology frequently leads to conflict between 
the protection of civil liberties and the government’s need to pre-
serve national security.1  As the world becomes dangerous in new 
ways, new techniques are developed to combat the hazards.  This can 
have the unfortunate side effect of eroding individual protections un-
til the laws that ensure them evolve to catch up.  This tension is ex-
emplified by the application of the border search exception to the 
Fourth Amendment, which allows for warrantless and suspicionless 
searches of the luggage of anyone crossing the United States border,2 
to data stored on laptop computers and other electronic devices such 
as cell phones and personal digital assistants. 
It may surprise many travelers to learn that any time they enter or 
leave the United States, the Department of Homeland Security claims 
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 1 See Jerel A. Rosati, At Odds with One Another:  The Tension Between Civil Liberties and National 
Security in Twentieth-Century America, in AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 9, 9 (David B. Cohen & John W. Wells eds., 2004) (“The de-
mands of democracy and the demands of national security inherently have contradictory 
implications . . . .”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (discussing the 
potential impact of new technologies on “the realm of guaranteed privacy” as a matter 
that the Supreme Court must confront).  See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment 
and New Technologies:  Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 
(2004) (arguing that courts should approach the Fourth Amendment with caution when 
technology is in flux). 
 2 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (noting that Customs officers have the 
authority to search luggage entering the United States at random in the absence of indi-
vidualized suspicion); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (stating that typ-
ically, border searches “are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the 
border”).  The exception to the warrant requirement applies to searches taking place at 
the physical border as well as international airports within the United States, considered 
to be the “functional equivalent[].”  Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 
(1973). 
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the right to search, seize, and duplicate the information contained in 
their laptops, BlackBerrys, and other electronic storage devices.3  Al-
though the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue, a few 
travelers have challenged the constitutionality of such searches, and 
the matter has been addressed by several circuit courts.  Most re-
cently, in April 2008, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s 
holding4 in United States v. Arnold and accepted the government’s con-
tention5 that Customs officers and Department of Homeland Security 
agents may search, seize, and even copy information contained in 
electronic devices without cause or suspicion.6 
This Comment analyzes the ambiguities and potential constitu-
tional problems posed by this practice.  They continue to be a threat, 
despite some improvements in the protection of civil liberties imple-
mented by the Obama administration.  The Comment discusses the 
failure of the lower federal courts to adequately balance the privacy 
and confidentiality concerns of the law-abiding traveler against po-
tential but unlikely national security threats, and the resulting weak-
ening of the traditional protections afforded by the Fourth Amend-
ment.  It concludes by suggesting stronger protective measures in 
several areas, as well as avenues of recourse for the traveler facing 
such a search.  The adoption and implementation of these could go a 
long way toward striking a more appropriate balance between na-
tional security and the constitutional guarantee of individual freedom 
from unreasonable search and seizure. 
 
 3 See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales, Run For the Border:  Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2009) (“When told that the government claims the 
power to rummage through travelers’ laptops, BlackBerrys, and flash drives at the border, 
many people react with shock, even revulsion.”); Press Release, Ass’n of Corporate Travel 
Executives, ACTE Survey Shows Threat of Laptop Seizure at U.S. Borders Still Unknown 
to International Business Travelers (Jan. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.acte.org/resources/press_release.php?id=267 (announcing results of a sur-
vey by the Association of Corporate Travel Executives showing “that a huge segment of 
[individuals] responsible for the international transportation assets of compa-
nies . . . indicated they were unaware that computers and other devices, such as Blackber-
rys, iPhones, iPods, flashdrives and cameras, can be examined, searched, and seized—
without warrant nor provocation—when crossing a U.S. border”). 
 4 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 523 F.3d 941 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 5 Government’s Opening Brief at 17, United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(No. 06-50581). 
 6 See Arnold, 523 F.3d at 946. 
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I.  HISTORY OF THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, 
in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”7  When a 
governmental search or seizure will violate an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the searcher is typically required to obtain a 
warrant in advance.8  Warrants ensure that an impartial magistrate 
has reviewed the circumstances and found sufficient probable cause 
of wrongdoing to justify a search and the resulting invasion of pri-
vacy.9 
Congress10 and the Supreme Court11 have definitively established 
the existence (though not the precise parameters) of recognized ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement in certain situations,12 including 
the border search doctrine.  In 1985, the Court held in United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez that warrants were not required for “routine” 
border searches, and that such searches could be performed in the 
absence of probable cause or even reasonable suspicion.13  Examina-
tion of luggage is almost unquestionably necessary so that Customs 
agents can ensure that narcotics, explosives, and the like are not en-
tering the country.  Even those who oppose the application of the 
border search doctrine to computers and electronic devices agree 
 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, OFFICE OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 2–3 (2001). 
 9 See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has 
interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police . . . so that an objective mind 
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.”). 
 10 See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006) (“Any officer . . . may at any time go on board of any vessel 
or vehicle at any place in the United States . . . [search the vehicle] . . . and any person, 
trunk, package, or cargo on board . . . .”).  Federal courts have warned that this statute 
must be read “in light of the [F]ourth [A]mendment’s requirement that searches and 
seizures be reasonable.”  Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 11 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (“[The] longstanding recognition 
that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonethe-
less ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.”). 
 12 Other exceptions to the warrant requirement include the plain view doctrine, discussed 
in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), searches made incident to a lawful arrest, ad-
dressed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and searches made under exigent cir-
cumstances, explained in United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 13 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
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that Customs agents must have the ability to search the belongings 
and person of travelers for contraband and other dangerous items.14 
Even at the border, where the federal government’s national secu-
rity authority receives enormous deference, search authority is not 
unlimited.  The Supreme Court has held that “interests in human 
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects” require 
that a standard of reasonable suspicion be met before invasive body 
searches are permissible.15  Lower courts have interpreted this to 
mean that, at least when applied to searches of the body, “[a]s the 
search becomes more intrusive, more suspicion is needed.”16 
The United States Supreme Court has also left open the possibility 
that searches of property could be so offensive, intrusive, or destruc-
tive as to require a finding of particularized suspicion or probable 
cause to render them constitutional.17 
One helpful, although somewhat imprecise, way of conceptualiz-
ing the historical approach to search and seizure at the United States 
border is to divide searches into two categories:  “routine” and “non-
routine.”18  “Routine” searches, such as the typical examination of the 
contents of an individual’s luggage or pockets, do not require any 
suspicion.19  “Non-routine” searches, while not limited by the “prob-
able cause” and warrant requirements20 present within the United 
 
 14 See, e.g., Nanci Clarence & Craig Bessenger, They Have Ways of Making Your Laptop Talk, 
THE RECORDER, July 2, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
PubArticle.jsp?id=1202422588869 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s “cursory analysis of 
computers in the Fourth Amendment context,” but acknowledging that “border searches 
date from the nation’s earliest years, and the United States has a clear interest in inter-
cepting contraband at the border”). 
 15 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 769–70 (1966)).  Montoya de Hernandez defines “reasonable suspicion” by analogizing 
to the following language from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968):  “[I]n justifying the 
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion.”  Id. at 540. 
 16 United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 17 See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541–42 (noting that border officials must have a 
“‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person’ of alimentary ca-
nal smuggling” before performing an alimentary canal search); United States v. Ramsey, 
431 U.S. 606, 618, n.13 (1977) (“[A] border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ be-
cause of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”); United States v. 
Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held open the pos-
sibility, ‘that some searches of property are so destructive as to require’ particularized sus-
picion.” (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004))). 
 18 See Clarence & Bessenger, supra note 14 (discussing recent border search jurisprudence 
and attempting to place it in historical context). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
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States, require at the least a finding of reasonable suspicion to be 
constitutional.21  Non-routine, invasive searches of the person, such as 
x-rays, strip searches, and cavity searches, have been held to require 
at least reasonable suspicion,22 not because the human body receives 
explicit constitutional protection, but because such searches impli-
cate “dignity and privacy”23 interests not at issue in regular searches of 
luggage.  Thus, the question of constitutionality may turn on what the 
criteria are for authorization of a non-routine search. 
Though many commentators have chosen to infer the existence of 
a bright-line rule,24 the Supreme Court has never chosen to classify 
property searches as routine and body searches as non-routine.  Had 
the Court intended this, it could easily have said so explicitly in Flores-
Montano25 and Montoya de Hernandez,26 instead of leaving open the pos-
sibility that some searches of property might be so invasive or intru-
sive as to require individualized suspicion.27  It seems logical to con-
clude that just as not all border searches of the person are considered 
particularly invasive and thus non-routine, not all searches of prop-
erty may be considered to be non-invasive and therefore routine. 
II.  THE BORDER SEARCH DOCTRINE APPLIED TO LAPTOPS AND OTHER 
ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
Thus far, the government has claimed the authority to access the 
data in electronic devices as it does the objects in a suitcase.  The 
contents of a laptop obviously differ in type and quantity,28 but there 
is another, possibly more significant difference between a typical lug-
gage examination and the search of an electronic device—detailed 
searches of electronic data typically take place after the hard drive 
has been “mirrored,” so that the government retains a perfect copy of 
 
 21 See id. 
 22 See, e.g., United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 23 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966) (“The interests in human dig-
nity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the 
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Sales, supra note 3, at 1109–10 (noting that “[t]he Court appears to be drawing a 
rather bright-line rule” between searches of the body which may in some circumstances 
require reasonable suspicion, and searches of property, which do not). 
 25 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004). 
 26 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). 
 27 See also Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (rejecting the creation of a complex balancing test 
to categorize border searches). 
 28 See United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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all of the information contained therein.29  Password protection or 
methods of encryption intended to protect confidential information 
may offer no security, as travelers have been ordered by Customs 
agents to enter their passwords before turning over their devices for 
examination.30 
Customs is not required to publish records of the circumstances 
surrounding searches and seizures of laptops and other electronic 
devices,31 so much of the data is necessarily anecdotal.  Despite this 
lack of official information, there is no shortage of stories.  Kamran 
Habib, a software engineer and permanent resident of the United 
States, told the Washington Post that his computer and cellular phone 
were searched three times in one year, and that during one of those 
searches, an agent went through every phone number and text mes-
sage stored on his phone.32  An engineer and U.S. citizen who spoke 
to the Post anonymously was ordered to enter the password to log on 
to his business computer, over his protests that it belonged to his 
company and was not his personal property.33  Bill Hogan, a freelance 
journalist, had his luggage searched and his laptop seized for nearly 
two weeks when he returned to the United States from a trip to Ger-
many.  He spoke of the particular difficulties facing those in his pro-
fession:  “It was fortunate that I didn’t use [the laptop] for 
work . . . or I would have had to call up all my sources and tell them 
that the government had just seized their information.”34 
 
 29 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 540–41 
(2005) (explaining “the creation of a perfect ‘bitstream’ copy or ‘image’ of the original 
storage device,” which “duplicates every bit and byte on the target drive including all 
files”); Sales, supra note 3, at 1118 (“There is no need to return the bitstream copy to the 
owner; the owner has the original data in his possession all along, and the government 
presumably could retain the copy for extended, even infinite, periods of time once the 
analysis is complete, perhaps perpetually.”). 
 30 See David E. Brodsky et al., At the Border, Your Laptop is Wide-Open, NAT’L LAW J., July 22, 
2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=
1202423144224) (“[B]order searches, ‘from before the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item 
in question had entered into our country from outside.’”) (quoting United States v. Ram-
sey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)). 
 31 Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Returning from Overseas Tra-
vel:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Susan K. Gurley, Executive Director, 
Association of Corporate Travel Executives). 
 32 See Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches:  U.S. Agents Seize Travelers’ Devices, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008, at A1. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Alex Kingsbury, Seizing Laptops and Cameras Without Cause:  A Controversial Customs Practice 
Creates a Legal Backlash, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 24, 2008, 
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Individuals attempting to leave the United States are subject to 
the same suspicionless searches and seizures.35  Maria Udy, a British 
citizen living and working in Maryland, was told that unless she 
handed over her laptop, she would not be permitted to board a flight 
from Washington, D.C. to London.36  She was given no reason for the 
seizure, but instead was asked to provide her log-in information and 
informed that she would receive her computer within two weeks.37  
While this practice alone is problematic and potentially catastrophic 
for a businesswoman like Udy (who is employed by a global travel 
management firm), her story is particularly disturbing because 
“[m]ore than a year later, Udy [had] received neither her laptop nor 
an explanation.”38 
Under the Bush administration, Customs and the Department of 
Homeland Security strongly resisted repeated requests to outline 
their procedures for the seizure of electronic data, despite Freedom 
of Information Act requests filed by two non-profit organizations and 
a written request by Senator Russ Feingold, the Chairman of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution.39 
There was cause for optimism as the Obama Administration as-
sumed the helm in early 2009.  President Obama could have been 
speaking directly to outraged civil libertarians—or concerned busi-
ness travelers—when he stated:  “As for our common defense, we re-
ject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.  Our 
Founding Fathers, faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, 
drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man.”40  
Unfortunately, new hopes have not proven entirely justified thus far. 
In August 2009, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano re-
leased new directives on searches of electronic information, for Im-




 35 See United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991) (extending the border 
search exception to routine outbound searches).  However, in his article defending the 
current border search policies, Nathan A. Sales notes that “a number of judges and aca-
demics have questioned whether the Fourth Amendment permits officials to conduct 
suspicionless searches of persons or property leaving the country.”  Sales, supra note 3, at 
1099 n.31. 
 36 Nakashima, supra note 32. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Hearings, supra note 31 (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Chairman of Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary), 
available at http://feingold.senate.gov/statements/08/06/20080625.htm. 
 40 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2008). 
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Protection.41  Framed as “guidelines,” the directives were perhaps 
most significant in signaling that the Obama administration is aware 
of the importance of greater transparency when confronting issues 
that could have such an enormous effect on so many Americans.42  
They contained general maximums for the length of searches:  ab-
sent undefined extenuating circumstances, those undertaken by U.S. 
Customs ought not to take more than five days, and Immigrations 
and Customs searches ought not to last longer than a month.43 
Unfortunately, the changes implemented did not go far enough. 
While travelers may be allowed to be present for at least the initial 
examination of their laptops (though presumably not for the entire 
five to thirty days during which a search may occur under “non-
extenuating” circumstances), this does not necessarily extend so far 
as to give them the right to witness the search itself.44  Permission to 
sit across the room while Customs officers performed even a cursory 
examination of the contents of one’s laptop or BlackBerry would 
provide little comfort to an individual carrying confidential or even 
merely personal information.  Elizabeth Goitein, the head of the lib-
erty and national security project at the Brennan Center for Justice, 
summed up the disappointment of civil liberties groups, stating:  
“Under the policy begun by Bush and now continued by Obama, the 
government can open your laptop and read your medical records, fi-
nancial records, e-mails, work product and personal correspon-
dence—all without any suspicion of illegal activity.”45 
Additionally, information obtained in this way, without any find-
ing of suspicion, can be shared with other government agencies “on a 
case by case basis, as appropriate.”46  Copies of the information are to 
 
 41 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices (Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Dir. 3340-049, Border 
Search of Electronic Devices Containing Information (Aug. 20, 2009). 
 42 See Ellen Nakashima, Bush’s Search Policy for Travelers is Kept, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009, at 
A3 (noting that the policy “describes more fully than did the Bush administration the 
procedures by which travelers’ laptops, iPods, cameras and other digital devices can be 
searched and seized when they cross a U.S. border”). 
 43 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices (Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Dir. 3340-049, Border 
Search of Electronic Devices Containing Information (Aug. 20, 2009). 
 44 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices 3 (Aug. 18, 2009) (“To the extent practicable, border searches should be con-
ducted in the presence of, or with the knowledge of, the traveler.”).  See also Mike M. Ah-
lers, Border Rules Revised on Search, Seizure of Electronics, Digital Files, CNN.COM, Aug. 27, 
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/08/27/borders.computers/index.html. 
 45 See Nakashima, supra note 42. 
 46 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices 2 (Aug. 18, 2009). 
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be made for this purpose, and though the directives mandate that 
copies possessed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement must be 
destroyed within twenty-one days of the conclusion of the (potentially 
indefinite) search,47 no such guarantee exists for additional copies 
made and shared with other government agencies.  Customs may 
share the copies to receive assistance in the search or for any other 
purpose, and those agencies may retain the information if it is found 
to have “national security or intelligence value.”48  There is no indica-
tion that a judge will be asked to sign off on this determination or 
that the individual will be informed of the additional copies that have 
been disseminated and retained.  The vague nature of this authoriza-
tion is troubling as federal agencies could readily come up with ar-
guments why almost any piece of information might have “value” in 
the national security or intelligence field. 
The policies do mandate that agents document their searches,49 
but they do not provide the traveler with any right to access the do-
cumentation in order to find out what information was examined and 
possibly retained by any federal agency.  The traveler is also not pro-
vided with notification when and if the search is deemed “completed” 
and copied information is actually destroyed. 
Further, protections for lawyers and others who might be traveling 
with confidential information are unclear.  The directives state essen-
tially that some information may be subject to “special handling” ei-
ther for policy reasons or by law, but that “a claim of privilege or per-
sonal information does not prevent the search of a traveler’s 
information at the border.”50 
A disclaimer that the directives do not create any rights or guaran-
tees that could be invoked by an individual51 tempers what limited as-
surance the policies may actually provide to travelers. 
 
 47 Id. at 8. 
 48 Id. 
 49 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices (Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Dir. 3340-049, Border 
Search of Electronic Devices Containing Information (Aug. 20, 2009). 
 50 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices 9 (Aug. 18, 2009).  See also Odean L. Volker, Lawyers, Laptops, and the Border, 72 
TEX. B.J. 640, 643 (2009) (discussing the special dilemma faced by traveling attorneys and 
noting that, though “both CBP and ICE have recognized the need for special treatment 
of attorney-client privileged information, neither gives specific guidance on what that 
special treatment would be or the best practice for raising privilege during a border 
search”). 
 51 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dir. 7-6.1, Border Searches of Electronic 
Devices 10 (Aug. 18, 2009). 
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III.  BAD FACTS MAKE BAD LAW—UNITED STATES V. ARNOLD 
Given that even prominent defenders of the government’s appli-
cation of the border search exception to electronic devices recognize 
that the practice may be highly offensive to travelers,52 one would ex-
pect to see significant legal challenges brought under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Such challenges might compel courts to order a recon-
sideration of current practices.  Unfortunately, as the saying goes, 
“bad facts make bad law,”53 and no “good” factual scenario has turned 
up in federal court thus far.  Individuals seeking to suppress child 
pornography found on their computers have brought every serious 
courtroom challenge to the constitutionality of the border search ex-
ception as applied to electronic devices,54 and, not surprisingly, they 
have proven to be unsympathetic plaintiffs.55 
In the most recent high-profile case, United States v. Arnold, the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that ap-
plying the border search doctrine to laptop computers was excessively 
intrusive and violated the Fourth Amendment.56  The court granted a 
motion to suppress child pornography found on the defendant Ar-
nold’s laptop during a suspicionless border search because “[w]hile 
not physically intrusive as in the case of a strip or body cavity search, 
the search of one’s private and valuable personal information stored 
on a hard drive or other electronic storage device can be just as 
much, if not more, of an intrusion into the dignity and privacy inter-
ests of a person.”57  The court held that border searches of electronic 
storage devices must be based on reasonable suspicion at a mini-
mum.58 
 
 52 See, e.g., Sales, supra note 3. 
 53 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  See also United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 548 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is 
a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged 
in controversies involving not very nice people.” (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))). 
 54 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hilliard, 
289 F. App’x 239 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 55 See Matthew R. Hall, Border Fiction:  Does an Analogy to Immigration Law Alleviate Fourth 
Amendment Anxiety?, 78 MISS. L. J. 363, 378 (2008) (claiming that “if the cases most actively 
litigated arise out of those ‘hits’ rather than out of the ‘misses,’ [where a search was un-
justified], a danger arises.  The search program superficially appears successful after the 
fact of a positive result—it appears justified because it succeeded”). 
 56 454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 57 Id. at 1000. 
 58 Id. at 1001. 
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On April 21, 2008, the Ninth Circuit reversed this holding, refus-
ing to distinguish between an electronic device and any other con-
tainer brought into the country.59  The Court of Appeals held that the 
lower court erred in applying an intrusiveness analysis to the search 
of Arnold’s laptop, stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Flores-
Montano precluded the use of that standard for property searches.60  
The court rejected Arnold’s attempt to analogize the privacy expecta-
tions for a laptop to those for the home.61  The opinion stated that 
case law did not support a finding that a search could be considered 
especially offensive due to the storage capacity of the object being 
searched,62 but acknowledged that “the Supreme Court has left open 
the question of whether, and under what circumstances, a border 
search might be deemed unreasonable because of the particularly of-
fensive manner in which it is carried out.”63 
This ruling was a significant setback for groups concerned with 
the civil liberties and privacy interests of international travelers, who 
had applauded the district court decision for distinguishing border 
searches of laptops from traditional searches of luggage or other be-
longings.64 
IV.  INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN SEARCH OR SEIZURE OF INFORMATION 
STORED ON ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
People today are mobile to a degree that the Framers could hardly 
have imagined.  Their computers frequently function as mobile of-
fices, contain more than any file cabinet ever could and retain every 
file or piece of data ever accessed.  Judge Pregerson, who authored 
the district court opinion in Arnold, wrote that laptops and similar de-
vices “function as an extension of our own memory.”65  If the Fourth 
Amendment is meant to protect the individual’s reasonable expecta-
 
 59 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1008. 
 62 Id. at 1009–10. 
 63 Id. at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Travel Screening, http://www.eff.org/issues/travel-
screening (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (claiming that “the ongoing searches of laptops, cell 
phones, and other electronic devices at America’s borders are unconstitutionally inva-
sive”); Association of Corporate Travel Executives, Traveler Security and Data Privacy, 
http://www.acte.org/content/laptop_seizures (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (noting that 
travelers have had to react to requirements that can prove an impediment to the conduct 
of business). 
 65 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 533 F.3d 1003 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
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tion of privacy,66 it is logical to consider how innovations in technol-
ogy might alter the circumstances in which an individual’s privacy in-
terest merits particular protection.  This in turn requires considera-
tion of how new technologies may have altered the individual’s 
expectation of privacy.67 
In the Fourth Amendment context, federal courts have repeatedly 
found that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of their own computers.68  In fact, owners have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of any closed container,69 in-
cluding the data stored inside electronic devices.70  Outside of the 
border-search context, extensive protections are available to ensure 
the security of privileged or proprietary information:  attorney-client 
protections are among the highest privileges granted under law, and 
the crucial confidentiality of business information such as trade se-
crets, journalistic sources, potential merger agreements, and reports 
on internal investigations can be all but guaranteed by contractual ar-
rangements.  To establish an end-run around these considerations, 
otherwise sanctioned by United States law, merely because a law-
abiding citizen chooses to cross the border, injects an inappropriate 
and potentially unlimited amount of uncertainty into the normal 
course of business for the individual and his or her employer. 
The search and seizure of data on a laptop computer is simply too 
intrusive to be considered a “routine” border search and, as such, lik-
ened to the physical examination of an individual’s luggage for drugs 
or stolen property.  The Supreme Court has stated that “physical en-
try of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
 
 66 See, e.g., Sara M. Smyth, Searches of Computers and Computer Data at the United States Border:  
The Need for a New Framework Following United States v. Arnold, U. ILL J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
69, 95 (2009) (“The question of whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy is the sine qua non of a Fourth Amendment search.”). 
 67 Even experienced travelers are unaware of the degree to which their devices are subject 
to search.  Press Release, Ass’n of Corporate Travel Executives, supra note 3. 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in password-protected computer files); United States v. 
Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Individuals generally possess a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their home computers.”). 
 69 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982). 
 70 See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment protection of closed computer files and hard drives is similar to the protec-
tion it affords a person’s closed containers . . . . [T]he owner’s expectation of privacy re-
lates to the contents of that container rather than the container itself.”) (citation omit-
ted); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that an 
individual’s privacy interest in a pager and its data is analogous to that in any other closed 
container). 
Mar. 2010] SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF ELECTRONIC DATA 863 
 
Fourth Amendment is directed,”71 but also that, “the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places”72—and the protections bestowed 
should not be entirely obliterated simply because a person opts to 
travel in or out of the United States.  In every search and seizure of 
electronic information, there is enormous potential for a violation of 
the owner’s expectation of privacy, such that the reasonable suspicion 
requirement should be extended to in-depth searches of laptops and 
other electronic devices at the border.73 
Contrary to the claims of the Department of Homeland Security, 
the devices are conceptually very different from a suitcase.  Some 
commentators have presented persuasive arguments that due to the 
personal nature of the information therein and the privacy interest of 
the owner, examinations of laptop computers ought to be analogized 
to searches and seizures taking place in the home or the office. 
In a recent article, commentator Rasha Alzahabi discusses one 
compelling reason to regard searches of electronic data differently 
than other items brought across the border:  the contents of elec-
tronic devices are intangible.74  As justifications of the border search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “are usu-
ally framed in terms of ‘who and what may enter the country,’ these 
justifications do not apply to suspicionless laptop border searches. 
The information saved on a laptop can be transported into our coun-
try electronically, regardless of whether the traveler or the laptop 
crosses the border.”75 
Alzahabi also expresses doubt about the constitutionality of a war-
rantless search that is intended to find general evidence of illegal ac-
tivity, whether in the form of terrorist attack plans or caches of child 
pornography.76  She cites Colorado v. Bertine, a case considering the 
 
 71 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 72 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 73 See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 66, at 95 (“Given their unique ability to reveal vast amounts of 
highly personal information, in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, these searches must be viewed as nonroutine and preceded by reasonable suspi-
cion.”). 
 74 Rasha Alzahabi, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad?:  The Fourth 
Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REV. 161 (2008). 
 75 Id. at 175 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977)).  See also Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Karen M. Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests and Searches in the Context of 
Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 821 (2009) (noting that “the law enforcement 
justification that has always been stressed with regard to the border are illegal immigra-
tion of individuals, contraband, weapons—that seems so unlikely when you turn on a lap-
top and see the files”). 
 76 Alzahabi, supra note 74, at 177. 
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constitutionality of examining closed containers during routine in-
ventory searches of automobiles.77  There, the Supreme Court speci-
fied that searches made “solely for the purpose of investigating crim-
inal conduct” must meet warrant (and attendant probable cause) 
requirements as mandated by the Fourth Amendment.78  “Thus,” she 
argues, warrantless and “intrusive border searches may not be con-
ducted solely for the purpose of catching criminals or terrorists; ra-
ther, they must be consistent with the traditional rationales justifying 
the border search—the prevention of the entry of illegal aliens and 
contraband into our country.”79  Although Alzahabi does not explore 
this issue in depth, focusing instead on the intrusiveness of laptop 
searches,80 the “purpose” distinction is important:  searching through 
someone’s luggage in the typical manner clearly serves the “tradi-
tional rationales” of the border search—it will be revealed if he or she 
is attempting to conceal items or people prohibited in the United 
States.  To require particularized suspicion before any search would 
render every ordinary, random luggage inspection constitutionally 
questionable.  The border search exception when applied to elec-
tronic data seems to target different types of crimes.  Further, if 
searches in the name of looking into general “criminal conduct” are 
impermissible without a warrant, it seems illogical that searches of 
laptop computers leaving the country can be constitutionally con-
ducted without any suspicion or finding of probable cause.81  A more 
appropriate balance can and should be struck between the compet-
ing interests of privacy and security. 
Previous legal commentary on the subject has tended to focus on 
the rights of individuals whose electronic devices may contain illicit 
information. While it is essential to protect the rights of criminal de-
fendants, it is equally important to consider the impact of these 
search policies on individuals who are not engaging in illegal behav-
ior—after all, they are less likely to challenge the procedures but may 
be impacted just as significantly.82 
 
 77 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
 78 Id. at 371. 
 79 Alzahabi, supra note 74, at 176.  See also BRUCE A. NEWMAN, AGAINST THAT “POWERFUL 
ENGINE OF DESPOTISM”:  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND GENERAL WARRANTS AT THE 
FOUNDING AND TODAY ix (2007) (analyzing the limitations placed on searches aimed at 
criminal activity). 
 80 Alzahabi, supra note 74, at 178. 
 81 Id. at 176–77 (discussing various reasons in favor of requiring suspicion for laptop border 
searches). 
 82 See Hall, supra note 55, at 378 (noting that border searches “affect an enormous number 
of individuals for each case that nets the government criminal conduct”). 
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V.  SPECIAL CONCERNS OF PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
The federal courts have previously justified the border search doc-
trine by finding that the United States “has an overriding interest in 
securing the safety of its citizens” in preventing the entry of contra-
band, and that “greater interest on the side of the government at the 
border is coupled with a lesser interest on the side of the potential 
entrant.”83  While this may be the case when the “potential entrant” 
attempts to bring in child pornography, the law-abiding attorney or 
business traveler maintains a critical interest in preserving the secu-
rity of the information on his laptop or other electronic device. 
In United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Su-
preme Court has left open the possibility of a reasonable suspicion 
requirement for some types of border searches of property—for ex-
ample, searches that are especially damaging.84  The court noted that 
the defendant never raised the issue of “exceptional damage to prop-
erty” but that defendant did claim that the procedures inflicted upon 
him were “particularly offensive,” and it rejected the latter argu-
ment.85  A traveler whose information could be considered valuable 
property, wholly or in part because of its confidentiality, should have 
a much stronger claim that a search was exceptionally damaging or 
particularly offensive if it resulted in the seizure, reproduction, or loss 
of confidentiality of his information. 
Issues of confidentiality in other contexts reaffirm the argument 
that as searches of computers present such a great danger of infring-
ing on privacy rights, the application of the traditional border search 
exception provides inadequate protection.86  Attorney-client commu-
nications are privileged in the United States, and federal courts have 
held that the constitutional right to effective legal representation and 
the privilege against self-incrimination justify this protection.87  The 
 
 83 United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 84 523 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 
155–56 (2004)). 
 85 Id. at 946–47 (“Whatever ‘particularly offensive manner’ might mean, this search cer-
tainly does not meet that test.  Arnold has failed to distinguish how the search of his lap-
top and its electronic contents is logically any different from the suspicionless border 
searches of travelers’ luggage that the Supreme Court and we have allowed.”). 
 86 Indeed, at least one commentator has argued persuasively that a whole new standard 
ought to be developed.  See Smyth, supra note 66, at 84 (“The risk is that if we confine 
ourselves to using traditional analogies, we cannot fully articulate what is fundamentally 
different about our privacy interests in information technology.”). 
 87 See JONATHAN AUBURN, LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE:  LAW AND THEORY 28 (2000) (dis-
cussing the protection of attorney-client communications and attorney-work product in 
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purpose of the attorney-client privilege, as stated by then-Justice 
Rehnquist, is “to encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public in-
terests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”88 Con-
fidentiality must be guaranteed to prevent chilling of communica-
tions between attorney and client, and to ensure that lawyers can 
effectively perform their function in society.89  In this increasingly di-
gitized age, attorneys frequently carry confidential information on 
their computers and personal digital assistants such as BlackBerrys.  
The attorney’s ability and duty to keep information confidential is 
certainly compromised when Customs agents can copy all of the data 
on an electronic storage device and the attorney is not given an ex-
plicit opportunity to protect the confidentiality of specific files or 
even to ensure that all copies have been securely destroyed.  As dis-
cussed briefly above, the manner in which an attorney might prevent 
such invasion is as yet undefined in the policies released by the De-
partment of Homeland Security.90 
The duty to keep information confidential is not unique to attor-
neys.  Physicians and psychologists carry patient records.  Business 
travelers may carry sensitive information detailing, for example, trade 
secrets or plans for taking a company public that they are contractu-
ally obligated to keep private.  While the legal and ethical violations 
in the above examples would not rise to the level of constitutional 
claims, they certainly provide support for the argument that the ex-
pectation of privacy in such information is sufficiently reasonable to 
require some level of suspicion before it is seized, copied, or 
searched.91 
The border-search exception as applied to electronic storage de-
vices has never been subjected to a serious challenge by an individual 
who was not carrying illicit data, but such a scenario is certainly plau-
sible.  Consider an American investment company that handles the 
portfolios of major foreign companies or even foreign governments.  
 
the United States as justified instrumentally because of concerns about effective legal 
counsel and representation). 
 88 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 89 See AUBURN, supra note 87, at 66 (“The argument often raised for absolute confidentiality 
is that without it people would be reluctant to speak openly and honestly with their law-
yers . . . .”). 
 90 See supra notes 41–51and accompanying text. 
 91 See Nakashima, supra note 32 (quoting Georgetown law professor David D. Cole:  “What a 
laptop records is as personal as a diary but much more extensive.  It records every Web 
site you have searched.  Every e-mail you have sent.  It’s as if you’re crossing the border 
with your home in your suitcase.”). 
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The investment information would be sensitive and confidential but 
perfectly legal to possess.  If a representative of the company travels 
in and out of the United States to do business and has stored this in-
formation on his computer (even if password protected), the United 
States government may “mirror” the individual’s hard drive, creating 
and retaining a perfect copy, or seize the original computer itself.  
This could be enormously costly or even paralyzing for a businessper-
son or another individual carrying critical, time-sensitive information.  
The traveler has no way of knowing what information was examined, 
or if perhaps the mirrored hard drive has been lost or further repro-
duced and disseminated somewhere in an enormous governmental 
bureaucratic maze. 
In the event that such a search does take place, the investment 
company may have an obligation to notify its foreign client that the 
information is in the possession of the United States government.92  It 
seems likely that, faced with such a possibility, the client may elect to 
do business only with local investment firms in the future. 
This is not an argument for a constitutional guarantee for United 
States businesspeople to work overseas, however the potential for 
such a situation indicates that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of computers belonging to individuals and corpora-
tions should be taken into account in the creation of border search 
policies.  If the same businessman was carrying a briefcase full of 
documents, the Customs agent would likely sift through it briefly—it 
is fantastical to imagine the agent, with no suspicion whatsoever, pho-
tocopying every item in the briefcase (and passing on additional cop-
ies to other government agencies) before returning the originals to 
their owner.93  It is even less likely that the briefcase would actually be 
seized from its owner for some period of time. 
The differences discussed above demonstrate that Judge Preger-
son was correct to conclude that “opening and viewing confidential 
computer files implicates dignity and privacy interests”94 and that “the 
information contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices 
 
 92 See Smyth, supra note 66, at 85 (“[C]ustoms officials can now copy and analyze confiden-
tial business files that may contain trade secrets or personal information about a com-
pany’s clients.  If the computer happens to belong to an attorney, the government can 
seize and copy privileged information.  This could result in a breach of confidentiality 
and may give rise to an obligation to notify clients of a security breach.”). 
 93 Even if this did occur, such copies could be more easily secured and would not take near-
ly as long to examine for evidence of illegality.  Electronic data has infinitely more poten-
tial to be lost, stolen, corrupted, or otherwise compromised. 
 94 United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 523 F.3d 941 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
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renders a search of their contents substantially more intrusive than a 
search of the contents of a lunchbox or other tangible object.”95  The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and Association of Corporate Travel 
Executives, in their joint brief to the Ninth Circuit in Arnold, ex-
plained the objective reasonableness of a strong expectation of pri-
vacy in one’s laptop computer:  the information contained on a citi-
zen’s laptop computer “is unique in its private nature, in its nearly 
limitless volume, in its pervasive role in our society, and in its capacity 
to be quickly copied, saved, and searched.”96  The nature of items in 
existence when the border search doctrine was established simply 
cannot be analogized to laptops and the like in any way that would 
justify suspicionless searches of the latter. 
VI.  ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Supporters of the government’s claim of full search authority ar-
gue that national security concerns outweigh any liberty or privacy in-
fringement that might come about as a result of the policies.97  Kelly 
Gilmore cautions against “[e]stablishing immunity for digital infor-
mation at the border,”98 envisioning dire results for both the War on 
Terror99—she notes the use of computers in planning the attack on 
the World Trade Center in 1993100 as well as a raid on a Pakistani 
home that uncovered computers containing data “indicating al Qae-
da’s resolve to commit more attacks on United States soil”101—and the 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Brief for Ass’n of Corporate Travel Executives and Electronic Frontier Foundation as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee at 7, United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-50581).  Even the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the District 
Court’s requirement of reasonable suspicion for laptop searches at the border, recently 
acknowledged that individuals “undoubtedly have a high expectation of privacy in the 
files stored on their personal computers.”  United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1146 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
 97 See, e.g., Kelly Gilmore, Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World:  Reproducing 
Electronic Evidence at the Border, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 759, 786 (2007) (“The compelling secu-
rity interests in the border context far outweigh the information privacy interests a trav-
eler may reasonably expect to have, especially in the context of personal objects.  Privacy 
expectations for the information contained in electronic devices are simply unreasonable 
and the consequences of such immunity would be enormous.”) (citations omitted). 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. at 787–88 (“As the rest of the world has turned to laptops and wireless communica-
tion devices for the storage of personal information, it appears terrorists have as well.”). 
100 Id. (citing Michael A. Vatis, Cyber Attacks:  Protecting America’s Security Against Digital Threats, 
in COUNTERING TERRORISM 219, 229 (Arnold M. Howitt & Robyn L. Pangi eds., 2003)). 
101 Id. at 788 (citing Bill Powell, Al-Qaeda in America:  The Terror Plot, TIME, Aug. 16, 2004, at 
28). 
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War on Drugs, in that it would prevent the uncovering of digital evi-
dence of “trafficking conspiracies.”102 
Gilmore also points to the record-keeping procedures maintained 
by Customs, referring to Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Flores-
Montano103 for support of the proposition that the keeping of records 
offers adequate protection to those who experience the seizure of 
their data.104  But the retention of “administrative” records by the fed-
eral government is of little use if individuals cannot get to them—
how are they to know why their information was seized or who has 
seen their data? 
Child pornography and terrorist schematics should certainly be 
prevented from entering the United States.  Anecdotes and court 
challenges described herein show that a few border searches have 
lead to the detection of child pornography.  There is no disputing 
that the government has a compelling interest in the control and 
prevention of such activity, but a reasonable suspicion standard 
would still allow for the search of the computers of likely offenders.105 
On the other hand, it is nearly incredible to imagine the frequent 
unmasking of terrorist plots on an individual’s computer during a 
suspicionless border search.  A traveler possessing truly dangerous da-
ta will almost certainly encrypt it heavily and nearly invisibly, or 
transmit it over the Internet rather than attempt to bring it into the 
United States on a hard drive.106  Using vague threats to justify the 
suspicionless, unchecked search and seizure of information from an 
unlimited number of travelers, while providing them no method of 
recourse in order to track their data and no enforceable guarantees 
of its security and confidentiality, infringes the liberty of millions of 
individuals in the name of insufficient and unfocused protection.107 
 
102 Id. at 788–89 (citing United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
103 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 156 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Cus-
toms keeps track of the border searches its agents conduct . . . . This administrative proc-
ess should help minimize concerns that . . . searches might be undertaken in an abusive 
manner.”). 
104 Gilmore, supra note 97, at 794–95. 
105 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (“The ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ standard has been applied in a number of contexts and effects a needed bal-
ance between private and public interests when law enforcement officials must make a 
limited intrusion on less than probable cause.”). 
106 See Thomas Claburn, Business, Cyber Liberties Groups Fight Laptop Searches, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, June 13, 2008, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/ 
client/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=208403992 (“The fact that such content can travel 
more or less unhindered over the Internet can be seen either as ironic or as a sign that 
the Internet will eventually be subjected to the same broad scrutiny (if it isn’t already).”). 
107 See Mitchell Zimmerman, Fenwick & West LLP, Privacy Alert:  Gov’t Rummaging 
Through Your Laptop’s Contents?  No Problem if You’re Re-Entering USA, Says Ninth 
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Law professor and former Department of Justice and Department 
of Homeland Security official Nathan A. Sales provides perhaps the 
most persuasive defense of the government’s application of the bor-
der search exception to laptops and other electronic storage devices 
in an article entitled Run For the Border:  Laptop Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment.108  He uses the history of the border search doctrine and 
the principle of “technological neutrality”109—the notion that the 
manner in which information is stored and carried by a traveler 
should not be a factor in the degree of protection it receives—to ar-
gue that suspicionless searches of laptops are constitutional. 
In arguing that the border search doctrine is constitutional as pre-
sently applied to electronic storage devices, Sales analogizes to inter-
national mail.110  He discusses the Supreme Court’s opinion in United 
States v. Ramsey, which held that it was constitutional for Customs offi-
cials to search incoming international mail for contraband.111  The 
Court emphasized that it should not matter if an envelope or package 
enters the country in the hands of a traveler (thus subject to suspi-
cionless search under the border search doctrine) or by mail.112  
Therefore, Sales argues that “[t]he mere fact of computerization 
shouldn’t make a difference”113 but this may be an inapposite anal-
ogy—after all, if data is sent into the country electronically it is not 
subject to suspicionless search and indefinite seizure.  When it comes 
to privacy protections for documents “sent” into the United States, 
computerization makes all the difference. 
Further, laptop searches themselves are not technologically neu-
tral.  It takes little time for a border officer to rifle through a suitcase 
 
Circuit (2008), http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/Litigation/
Privacy_Alert_04-30-08.pdf (“[W]hile Customs asserts that its officers ‘are trained to pro-
tect confidential information,’ it is difficult to know what this means in practice.”).  Zim-
merman envisions a number of potentially problematic scenarios implicating business 
plans, trade secrets, and legal information and goes on to note, “[o]n the other hand, if 
you actually are an al Qaeda terrorist, you will not likely find yourself seriously inconven-
ienced by these practices.  Insofar as a terrorist’s plans might require written materials, he 
can simply email them to himself and travel without a computer, purchasing a new one 
after arrival in the United States.”  Id.  But see Sales, supra note 3, at 1097–98 (“Moderately 
sophisticated terrorists and child predators could accomplish the same thing by upload-
ing materials to a private server . . . . Yet the fact that terrorists and others might use a 
number of techniques to commit their crimes does not diminish the magnitude of the 
government’s interest in inhibiting this particular technique.”). 
108 Sales, supra note 3. 
109 Id. at 1093. 
110 Id. at 1109. 
111 Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)). 
112 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620. 
113 Sales, supra note 3, at 1116 (footnote omitted). 
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to make sure that no contraband is being smuggled in, or to flip 
through a stack of photos to check for child pornography.  On the 
other hand, due to their enormous storage capacity, examinations of 
computers can take days, and thus are often performed with “mir-
rored” hard drives.  As Professor Smyth notes, deleted information is 
also readily recoverable in the search.114  If a suitcase search turned 
up everything that had ever been carried inside of it, even a cursory 
examination would be rendered much more invasive. 
Professor Sales demonstrates awareness that privacy and free ex-
pression concerns are implicated whenever a border search of a lap-
top computer or other storage device takes place.115  He mentions the 
special plight of the journalist, the attorney, or the business traveler, 
noting that current policies mean that “[p]eople who cannot realisti-
cally minimize their expressive activities, such as journalists, opinion 
leaders, and activists, might cope with border searches by minimizing 
their overseas travel,” while “[p]eople who cannot realistically mini-
mize their overseas travel, such as global businessmen, might cope 
with border searches by minimizing their expressive activities.  Either 
way, there is a risk that core constitutional values will be chilled.”116 
Ultimately, Sales concludes that the differences between a laptop 
and conventional luggage “do not justify a blanket ‘laptop exception’ 
to the border search doctrine.”117  This is undoubtedly true; however, 
there is no reason to conclude that because a blanket exemption 
would be unjustified, no protection is in order.  Instead, the courts 
should recognize that while “the expectation of privacy [is] less at the 
border than in the interior,”118 it still exists, and a reasonable suspi-
cion standard is an appropriate middle ground.119 
Despite his overarching conclusion that the Fourth Amendment 
itself offers “relatively weak constitutional protections” for these sig-
nificant issues,120 Sales does allow that a number of potentially benefi-
cial regulations could be implemented.  His article suggests that the 
Department of Homeland Security provide as much information as 
 
114 Smyth, supra note 66, at 94. 
115 Sales, supra note 3, at 1092 (“The most intimate details of a person’s life—e-mails to 
friends and colleagues, family photographs, financial records, and so on—are paraded in 
front of the officers at the customs checkpoint.”). 
116 Id. at 1101. 
117 Id. at 1093–94. 
118 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985). 
119 Some scholars argue for much stronger protections. For a few examples, see Sales, supra 
note 3, at 1106 n.81. 
120 Id. at 1094. 
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possible to the public about its search and seizure practices,121 noting 
that increasing public knowledge about these procedures (as well as 
formalizing standards for choosing who to search) will help prevent 
abuses.122  He calls for guidelines in the length of time a search may 
take.123  Most intriguing, he analogizes to minimization requirements 
in the domestic wire-tapping context and similar rules in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to suggest limits on the scope of a 
search when no criminal activity is initially uncovered.124 
A routine inspection of a suitcase is drastically different from the 
copying or seizure of the hard drive of a computer or PDA.  Customs 
agents acting without any suspicion should be able to open laptop 
computers and even ask their owners to turn them on, to be sure that 
they are what they seem to be and that they belong to their carriers.  
It is an enormous conceptual leap from that idea to the current state 
of the law—with no particular reason for concern, a Customs agent 
can order an individual entering or leaving the United States to enter 
his or her password into a computer and to leave behind the device, 
or one or more mirrored copies of its contents, without any re-
course.125 
VII.  ESTABLISHING A BETTER BALANCE 
The current government border search policies pose a threat to 
Fourth Amendment guarantees when applied to laptops and similar 
devices.  Either the legislature or the courts should step in and man-
date protections for travelers crossing the border. The legislature is 
perhaps better suited to implement such protections,126 and individu-
 
121 Id. at 1128. 
122 Id. at 1128–30. This raises the intriguing and disturbing hypothetical that a truly well-
informed public would then have no subjective expectation of privacy, which erodes any 
Fourth Amendment claim in this context but does nothing to protect civil liberties. 
123 See id. at 1130 (“Unfortunately, the [DHS] Policy Statement does not do much in this re-
gard.  It merely recites the boilerplate goal that searches of laptops should be completed 
within ‘a reasonable period of time.’” (footnote omitted)). 
124 Id. at 1131. 
125 See Steve Seidenberg, 9th Circuit:  Laptops May Be Subject to Customs Inspections After Overseas 
Trips, 5 A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 15, 2006, at 37 (quoting Shaun Martin, a law professor at 
the University of San Diego: “It is one thing to turn on your computer in the airport to 
make sure it is not a bomb.  It is another thing for customs officials to turn on your com-
puter and to read everything you ever wrote and to look at everything you ever down-
loaded.”). 
126 See Posting of Jennifer Granick to Deeplinks, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2008/05/protecting-yourself-suspicionless-searches-while-t (May 1, 2008) (suggesting that 
individuals contact their congressional representatives to express disagreement with the 
current governmental policies). 
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als concerned with their civil liberties should contact their congres-
sional representatives to continue to raise the profile of this issue.127 
The Supreme Court or Congress ought to establish definitively 
that reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing is necessary to legitimize 
searches or duplication of electronic information at the border, and 
Customs agents should be required to make the record of the search 
and the basis for finding particularized suspicion available to the af-
fected individual. 
An important first step is acknowledgement that it is possible to 
perform both a routine and a non-routine search of a laptop com-
puter.  A routine search might include a request for the owner to 
turn on the computer and perhaps even an examination of recently-
accessed or created files, strictly limited in time and scope and always 
in the presence of the owner.  Performing such a search in front of 
the owner would alleviate some concerns regarding the confidential-
ity of certain information. 
Further, when a hard drive is “mirrored,” a warrant should be re-
quired before any information from it is decrypted or passed on to 
another federal agency.128  Because a reproduction has been made 
and the individual subject to search is not being deprived of the use 
of his or her property, there is less argument that exigent circum-
stances prevent the typical resort to judicial oversight.  An impartial 
magistrate could also determine whether information has sufficient 
“value” to “national security or intelligence” to merit being passed on 
to other agencies.  This is particularly important as, according to the 
Department of Homeland Security, the agencies may retain any in-
formation based on their own “independent legal authority”—
although they would not have had the authority to seize it in the first 
place. 
 
127 Not all legislators have been silent.  Senator Russ Feingold introduced the Travelers’ Pri-
vacy Protection Act in the Senate, which would require reasonable suspicion before lap-
top searches and would limit seizures of electronic devices without probable cause to 
twenty-four hours.  Travelers’ Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008).  
Loretta Sanchez introduced the Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008 in the 
House, which calls for the establishment of a procedure to notify individuals if their data 
has been copied.  Border Security Search Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6869, 110th 
Cong. (2008).  Both bills died shortly after introduction and were never put to a vote.  
Govtrack.us, S. 3612, Travelers’ Privacy Protection Act of 2008, http://www.gov 
track.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3612; Govtrack.us, H.R. 6869, Border Security Ac-
countability Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-6869. 
128 Even Professor Sales, who defends the government policies, notes that with the practice 
of mirroring hard drives, “[l]aptop searches . . . raise the specter of officers retaining sen-
sitive data from an entirely innocent passenger’s computer for months, maybe even 
years.”  Sales, supra note 3, at 1124. 
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Strict guidelines should be established to ensure that travelers 
have a way of knowing what information has been copied, and to 
mandate notification when the information is destroyed after a de-
termination that it does not contain anything illicit. 
In the meantime, companies and individuals that deal with poten-
tially privileged, confidential, or time-sensitive information should be 
aware that anything stored on their PDAs, BlackBerrys, or computer 
hard drives can be examined, seized, and copied by the United States 
government during a border search.  Until a policy that better bal-
ances liberty and privacy concerns with those of national security is 
implemented, the safest solution is to leave electronic devices behind 
when leaving the United States. 
It is not the potential for enormous storage capacity, but rather 
the nature of what is stored and the invasion necessary to perform the 
search, that distinguishes the search and seizure of information on 
electronic storage devices from traditional border searches, and ren-
ders the former potentially “particularly offensive” and “exceptionally 
damaging.”129 
The adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard, as well as the 
specific protections discussed herein, would better protect both the 
common defense and the rights of the individual.  When faced with 
the next constitutional challenge, one hopes that the courts will cease 
to allow national security justifications to erode protection of civil lib-















129 See United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ase law does not sup-
port a finding that a search which occurs in an otherwise ordinary manner, is ‘particularly 
offensive’ simply due to the storage capacity of the object being searched.”). 
